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SECOND PARENT ADOPTION: A MODEL BRIEF
SUZANNE BRYANT'
THE LIBERAL JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF STATE ADOPTION LAWS ALLOWS
COURTS TO GRANT SECOND PARENT ADOPTIONS TO LESBIAN
AND GAY ADULTS
I. INTRODUCTION: SECOND PARENT ADOPTIONS
A second parent adoption refers to the adoption of a child by his or
her legal parent's1 non-marital partner, without requiring the first partner to
give up any parental rights or responsibilities.2 In second parent adoptions,
as in step-parent adoptions, the child is already living in the couple's home
and will continue to live there. In both types of adoptions, a non-legal par-
ent has a relationship with the child and wishes to adopt without terminat-
ing the legal parent's rights. Therefore, a second parent adoption is the natu-
ral extension of step-parent adoptions; in both cases, the couple simply de-
sires to provide legal and emotional stability for the child.
Second parent adoptions may occur when a child's heterosexual parents
are unable or unwilling to marry and establish paternity,3 or when the par-
ents are lesbian or gay. Courts have granted both heterosexual and lesbian
and gay second parent adoptions relying on the step-parent adoption analo-
gy.4
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In this model brief, I present arguments that were successful in a second parent adoption
of a child by his lesbian co-parents in Texas. To aid the practitioner, fact specific sections
have been deleted and arguments not limited to a particular jurisdiction have been empha-
sized. This model brief deviates from the accepted standard of including cites in the text of
a brief in order to provide additional comments and insights.
1. A child may have a legal parent either through birth or adoption. See, e.g., TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 11.01(3) (West 1986 & Supp. 1995) ("Parent means the mother, a man presumed
to be the biological father or a man who has been adjudicated to be the biological father by
a court of competent jurisdiction, or an adoptive mother or father.").
2. See Elizabeth Zuckerman, Comment, Second Parent Adoption for Lesbian-Parented Families:
Legal Recognition of the Other Mother, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 729, 731 n.8 (1986).
3. Although written as a model for lesbian and gay second parent adoptions, many of
the arguments presented are relevant to heterosexual second parent adoptions as well.
4. See infra notes 18-35 and accompanying text.
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When presented with a second parent adoption petition, a court initially
must decide (1) whether state law prohibits the two parents from filing a
joint adoption petition' and (2) whether granting the adoption requires the
court to terminate the legal parent's existing parental rights.' Once these
legal hurdles have been overcome, the primary issue before the court is
whether the adoption is in the child's best interest.
Second parent adoptions are in the child's best interest because they
stabilize the existing family unit and provide the child with numerous le-
gal/ psychological,. and economic benefits.9 In addition, the child suffers
no disadvantage where the law recognizes these preexisting bonds." Con-
versely, where the second parent adoption is not granted, the child is disad-
vantaged because from a legal perspective, one mother or father is a parent
and the other is a stranger.
II. ADOPTION STATUTES MUST BE CONSTRUED BROADLY To PROMOTE
THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
Adoption statutes focus on the best interest of the child." Although
courts are bound by statutory law, judges are often called upon to interpret
a vague statute or to resolve issues unanticipated by the legislature which
adopted the statute.2 Several courts have ruled that adoption statutes are to
be liberally construed with a view to effect their objects and to promote
5. In second parent adoption cases, the decision to file jointly or separately is often
strategic. Co-parents may choose to file jointly to ensure that the birth parent's legal rights
are not terminated as a result of the second parent adoption. Many state statutes have no
prohibitions on who may file joint petitions; these statutes merely require that both persons in
a marital relationship file for adoption. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 1 (Law. Co-op.
1994) ("If the petitioner has a husband or wife living, competent to join in the petition, such
husband or wife shall join therein, and upon the adoption, the child in law shall be the child
of both."); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN § 16.03(a) (West 1986) ("If a petitioner is married, both
spouses must join in the petition for adoption."). But see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West
1985) ("No person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is a homosex-
ual."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4 (1994) ("Specifically as follows, any individual not a
minor and not a homosexual may adopt ... ").
6. See, e.g., TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.03(b) (West 1986) ("[N]o petition for the adoption
of a child may be considered unless there has been a decree terminating the parent-child
relationship as to each living parent of the child or unless the termination proceeding is
joined with the proceeding for the adoption."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 448 (1989) ("The
natural parents of a minor child shall be deprived, by the adoption, of all legal right to con-
trol of such minor ... ").
7. See ifra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 36-50 and accompanying text.
9. See infta notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
11. E.g., Walker v. Texas Dept. of Human Resources, 667 S.W.2d 919, 921 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984) ("The paramount considerations in adoption proceedings are the rights and welfare of
the children involved and these statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the minor to
effectuate their beneficial purpose.").
12. See Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLUM. L. REV. 527,
529 (1947) ("The intrinsic difficulties of language and the emergence after enactment of situa-
tions not anticipated by the most gifted legislative imagination, reveal doubts and ambiguities
in statutes that compel judicial construction.").
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justice.13 Other courts must also employ liberal interpretation to achieve the
statute's purpose: the best interest of the child.
In most traditional adoptions, the child will not continue to live with
the biological parents after the adoption. Accordingly, a court cannot grant
an adoption petition unless there has been a prior decree terminating any
existing parent-child relationship." In these situations, termination facilitates
the child's adjustment into a new family, provides legal clarity, and is in the
child's best interest.
State legislatures, however, recognize that it would be illogical and
contrary to the child's best interest to destroy one parental relationship in
favor of another when both parents live with the child as a family unit.
Therefore, many adoption statutes contain a step-parent exception allowing
the spouse of the legal parent to adopt the child without terminating the
rights of the legal parent."5 The goal of the step-parent adoption is to create
the utmost support and legal security for the child. The same concerns are
paramount in lesbian and gay families in which only one parent is a legal
parent.
The Vermont Supreme Court recently applied the rationale underlying
the step-parent exception in granting a lesbian second parent adoption.'6 In
addressing the termination of parental rights provision, the court concluded:
[Tihis provision anticipates that the adoption of children will remove them
from the home of the biological parents, where the biological parents elect or
are compelled to terminate their legal obligations to the child. This legisla-
tive intent is evidenced by the step-parent exception, which saves the natural
parent's rights in step-parent adoptions. The legislature recognized that it
would be against common sense to terminate the biological parent's rights
when that parent will continue to raise and be responsible for the child,
albeit in a family unit with a partner who is biologically unrelated to the
child. 7
Other courts should also apply the logic of the step-parent exception to pre-
serve the bond between parent and child.
13. See, e.g., Department of Social Welfare v. Superior Court, 459 P.2d 867, 899 (Cal.
1969); In re Jordet, 80 N.W.2d 642, 646 (Minn. 1957); Walker, 667 S.W.2d at 926.
14.' See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
15. E.g., TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.03(c) (West 1986) ("[I]f a parent is presently the
spouse of the petitioner, no termination decree is required with respect to parental rights of
that parent."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 448 (1989) ("[Wihen the adoption is made by the
spouse of a natural parent, obligations of obedience to, and rights of inheritance by and
through the natural parent who has intermarried with the adoptive parent shall not be af-
fected.").
16. In re Adoptions of B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 682 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993). See also Deborah
Lashman, Second Parent Adoption: A Parent's Perspective, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 227 (No.
1 1995) (analyzing the second parent adoption process from the perspective of a non-biologi-
cal parent who became a legal parent).
17. In re B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B, 628 A.2d at 1274.
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III. COURTS HAVE GRANTED SECOND PARENT ADOPTIONS
TO UNMARRIED, HETEROSEXUAL COUPLES
In addressing adoptions by heterosexual couples, other courts have
often construed adoption statutes liberally and granted heterosexual second
parent adoptions to protect a child's existing family structure. In In re Adop-
tion of a Child by A.R.," the court allowed a non-legal parent to adopt with-
out terminating the fights of the unmarried legal parent. At the time of con-
ception, A.R. was the natural father of the child and was engaged to the
child's mother, subsequently, the mother became incompetent and was un-
able to marry." Since A.R. was not a "step-father," the New Jersey statute
contemplated termination of the mother's parental rights if the father's adop-
tion petition were granted.2" In spite of the fact that the parents were not
legally married, the court approved the adoption without terminating the
mother's rights.
Similarly, in In re A.J.J., Infant,2 a New York court considered the
adoption of a child by his non-legal parent without terminating the rights of
his unmarried legal parent. The child's parents entered into a long-term,
stable relationship and two years later conceived the child. For their own
reasons, the parents did not choose to marry. Under New York law, unless
the adoption is by a step-parent,' the biological parent must relinquish pa-
rental fights prior to the adoption.' In explaining its liberal interpretation
of the statute's termination of parental rights provision the court stated:
Society changes and, with it, so do mores. In this era of freedom of choice
and equality of rights for both parties, the child should not be denied the
privilege of legitimacy as well as the care and concern of his natural
mother's property and her rights of intestacy merely because these adult
natural parents refuse to marry.... The refusal by these natural parents to
wed should not contravene New York's policy of fostering the child's best
interests above all else. 4
Because the child's best interest is always paramount, courts enjoy broad
discretion in granting adoptions.2 Consequently, the New York court grant-
ed the adoption petition of the natural father who sought to preserve his
parental fights and obligations without terminating the mother's parental
rights.'
Like these heterosexual second parent adoption cases, no harm and a
great deal of benefit will occur if second parent adoptions are granted to
lesbian and gay couples where the court finds the adoption to be in the
18. 378 A.2d 87 (N.J. Super. Ct. Pro. Div. 1977).
19. Id. at 88.
20. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-30 (West 1953), repealed by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-50 (West 1977)
(amended 1994).
21. 438 N.Y.S.2d 444 (Sur. Ct. 1981).
22. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 110 (McKinney 1970) (amended 1984).
23. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1994).
24. In re A.J.J., Infant, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 446.
25. Id. at 446; In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Tex. 1984) (per curiam).
26. Id. at 447.
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child's best interest. Therefore, the court may, and should, liberally interpret
the adoption statute to promote the child's best interest by not terminating
the biological parent's rights in a second parent adoption.
IV. COuRTS HAVE GRANTED SECOND PARENT ADOPTIONS TO LESBIAN AND
GAY PARENTS
Courts in numerous jurisdictions have granted second parent adop-
tions.' Recently, the highest courts in Massachusetts and Vermont held that
neither state's adoption statutes expressly prohibit two unmarried cohabitants
from jointly petitioning for adoption.' Furthermore, neither court construed
the statutes to require termination of the legal parent's rights prior to grant-
ing th second parent adoption.9 This liberal interpretation allowed both
courts to legally recognize the existing family unit.
The Vermont Supreme Court recognized, in granting the second parent
adoption, that Deborah Lashman and Jane Van Buren were co-parents for
their two children" While the children perceived them to be equal parents,
prior to the ruling, Van Buren was the legal mother and Lashman was a
legal stranger. Although their second parent adoption petition was uncontest-
ed, the trial court denied the adoption, interpreting the Vermont adoption
statute to require termination of the biological parent's rights unless the
couple were married.3 In overruling the trial court, the Vermont Supreme
Court held that the adoption could be granted without terminating the bio-
logical parent's rights:
When social mores change, governing statutes must be interpreted to allow
for those changes in a manner that does not frustrate the purposes behind
their enactment. To deny the children of same-sex partners, as a class, the
security of a legally recognized relationship with their second parent serves
no legitimate state interest'
Thus, the court liberally interpreted the provision terminating parental rights
to ensure that the children had two loving, legally responsible parents.
27. See In re Adoption of a Minor Child (C), No. 1-JU-86-73 P/A (Alaska First Jud. Dist.
Feb. 6, 1987); In re Adoption of a Minor (1) & (M), Nos. A-269-90 & A-270-90 (D.C. Super.
Ct. Faro. Div. Aug. 30, 1991); In re Petition of E.S. & R.L., No. 90 Coa 1202, 1994 WL 157949
(Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook County Mar. 14, 1994); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993);
Adoption of Susan, 619 N.E.2d 323 (Mass. 1993); In re Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 632
A.2d 550 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993); In re Adoption of Caitlin & Emily, 1994 WL 149728
(N.Y. Faro. Ct. Monroe County Jan. 6, 1994); In re Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sur.
Ct. 1992); In re Adoption of E.O.G. & A.S.G., 14 Fiduc. Rep. 2d 125 (Pa. C.P. York County
Apr. 28, 1994); In re Adoptions of B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 682 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993); In re Adop-
tion of R.C., No. 9088 (Vt. P. Ct. Addison Dist. Dec 9, 1991). But see In re Adoption of Bruce
M., No. A-62-93 (D.C. Super. Ct. Fain. Div. Apr. 20, 1994) (denying gay couple's co-parent
adoption petition); In re Angel Lace, 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994) (denying lesbian couple's co-
parent adoption petition) motion for recons. denied Sept. 21, 1994.
28. Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 318; In re B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d at 1273.
29. Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 319; In re B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d at 1274.
30. In re B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d at 1272.
31. Id. at 1272-73.
32. Id. at 1275.
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Similarly, in In Re Adoption of Tammy,3  Massachusetts' highest court
granted a joint adoption petition by the child's biological mother and the
child's female co-parent. In interpreting the adoption statute, the court found
that while the legislature may not have envisioned adoption by same-sex
partners, there was no indication that it attempted to define all possible
categories of persons who could adopt under the statute.' Additionally, the
court held that the legislature did not intend to terminate a parent's rights
when that parent was one of the adoption petitioners.'
V. CHILDREN RECEIVE SIGNIFICANT BENEFITS FROM
SECOND PARENT ADOPTIONS
A child raised by a lesbian or gay couple is fortunate to have two car-
ing parents.' The child has two mothers or two fathers, both of whom are
equal in the child's mind, to depend on for love and support. 7 Like all
parents, lesbian and gay parents must balance jobs with family life, make
ends meet, and provide their child with guidance and support. Although
lesbian and gay parents cannot legally marry, there is no reason to believe
that they cannot form a stable home environment for the child. In fact, "[a]
large proportion of gay people are in steady relationships."'
33. 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993).
34. Id. at 319.
35. Id. at 321.
36. A New York court which granted a second parent adoption noted:
Today a child who receives proper nutrition, adequate schooling and supportive
sustaining shelter is among the fortunate, whatever the source. A child who also
receives the love and nurture of even a single parent can be counted among the
blessed. Here this Court finds a child who has all the above benefits and twvo adults
dedicated to his welfare, secure in their loving partnership, and determined to raise
him to the very best of their considerable abilities. There is no reason in law, logic
or social philosophy to obstruct such a favorable situation.
In re Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1002 (Sur. Ct. 1992).
37. Children form strong bonds with the people who are their daily caregivers. These
bonds are not dependent on biology and occur in adopted children and the children of lesbi-
an and gay parents:
Unlike adults, children have no psychological conception of relationship by blood-tie
uqtil quite late in their development .... What registers in their minds are the day-
to-day interchanges with the adults who take care of them and who, on the
strength of these, become the parent figures to whom they are attached.
J. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 12-13 (1973).
38. Gregory M. Herek, Myths About Sexual Orientation: A Launer's Guide to Social Science
Research, 1 LAW AND SEXUALITY 133, 161 (1991) (citing research that 60% of gay or bisexual
men and 64% of lesbian or bisexual women reported that they were currently in a relation-
ship). Long-term relationships occur in both male and female couples. In a study of 156 vol-
unteer gay male couples, researchers found that half of the couples had been together over
five years and 31% had been together for over 10 years. DAVID MCWHIRTER & ANDREW
MATrIsoN, THE MALE COUPLE: How RELATIONSHIPS DEVELOP 18 (1984). Anecdotal evidence
and samples that have included older persons suggest that relationships lasting twenty years
or longer are not uncommon. See, e.g., Rusty Brown, Always Me, in LONG TIME PASSING: LIVES
OF OLDER LESBIANS 144, 150 (Marcy Adelman ed., 1986) (discussing her 28 year relationship
with her lesbian life partner).
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Furthermore, studies indicate that children raised by lesbians or gay
men suffer no disadvantages.39 Children of lesbian or gay parents are no
more likely to be confused about their gender identification as male or fe-
male, no different in their gender-role behaviors, and no more likely to be
heterosexual, homosexual or bisexual.' Studies about other aspects of per-
sonal development also revealed similarities rather than differences:
As was true for sexual identity, studies of other aspects of personal develop-
ment-such as self-concept, locus of control, moral judgment, and intelligence-
revealed no significant differences between children of lesbian or gay parents
and children of heterosexual parents.4'
Additionally, fears that children of lesbian or gay parents might encoun-
ter difficulties in social relationships have proven unfounded.42 The myth
that lesbians and gay men are more likely to sexually abuse children than
are their heterosexual counterparts is also unfounded. 3 In many ways, these
myths and fears are a manifestation of a general cultural tendency to portray
disliked minority groups as a threat to society's most vulnerable members.
A child raised by lesbian or gay parents suffers no disadvantage; how-
ever, if the court does not permit a second parent adoption, the child is
deprived of legal rights and benefits afforded children of married heterosex-
ual parents. Adoption creates a legal parent-child relationship which includes
the legal responsibilities associated with child rearing. For example, a legal
parent has the duty to support the child by providing clothing, food, shelter,
medical care, and education.45 Prior to a second parent adoption, only the
biological parent in a lesbian or gay couple is legally required to perform
these caretaking functions. Although the non-legal parent may have agreed
to support the child, such agreements do not create legally binding relation-
ships. Thus, if the parents end their domestic partnership, the non-legal par-
ent is not required to pay child support.
A second parent adoption also ensures that a child will have a continu-
ing relationship with both parents in the event of death or separation. If
only one of the parents has legal ties with the child and that person dies,
the child has no legal right to remain with the surviving parent. Every child
deserves the security of knowing that they will not be taken from a surviv-
ing parent in the event of the other parent's death.
In the event of the legal parent's death, alternative protections to second
parent adoptions may fail to protect existing relationships between the non-
39. See In re J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550, 553-54 (N.J. Super. Ch. Ct. 1993) (quoting Charlotte J.
Patterson, Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents, 63 CHILD DEVELOPMENT, 1025, 1031-32 (1992)); In
re Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1001-02 n.1 (Sur. 1992) (citing Patterson, supra, at 1033).
40. Patterson, supra note 39, at 1033.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1034.
43. Gregory M. Herek, Stigma, Prejudice and Violence Against Lesbians and Gay Men, in Ho-
MOSEXUALITY: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 60, 69-72 (John C. Gonslorek &
James D. Weinrich, eds., 1991); Patterson, supra note 39, at 1034.
44. Herek, supra note 43, at 69.
45. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.04 (West Supp. 1994).
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legal parent and the child. For example, legal parents may nominate a
guardian in a will, but that guardianship is not guaranteed. In In re
Pearlman.' the child of a lesbian couple was caught in the center of a legal
battle between her non-legal mother and her deceased biological mother's
parents. The biological mother's will designated the woman's life-partner,
with whom she had raised the child, as the child's guardian. However, the
grandparents successfully challenged the guardianship and attempted to
adopt the child without notifying the child's surviving co-parent. After an
extended legal battle and a lengthy separation, the non-legal mother was
able to block the adoption and was finally reunited with her daughter.
As In re Pearlman demonstrates, a stable custody plan is necessary to
alleviate the emotional and psychological harm to the child. Like the break
up of a heterosexual marriage, the dissolution of a relationship between two
mothers or fathers may be devastating to a child. "It cannot be emphasized
enough that any attempt to deprive a child of one of his or her parents is
harmful to the child. There is no such thing as a child that is too young to
feel the loss."47 If both lesbian or gay parents are recognized as legal par-
ents, the law will afford children a better opportunity to maintain relation-
ships with each parent.
A decision by the highest court in New York indicates that without
such legal recognition, lesbian or gay second parents who separate from
their partners may not have legal standing to request contact with their
children. In In re Alison D. v. Virginia M., 8 the court noted the close and
nurturing relationship between the child and the second non-legal parent,
whom the child called "mommy." Nevertheless, the court held that she was
not legally a parent. She therefore lacked standing to request visitation with
the child upon the dissolution of the couple's relationship. 9 Subsequently,
and perhaps in reaction to the Alison D. decision, courts in New York began
granting second parent adoptions.'
In addition to protecting the child's relationships with both parents
when custody and visitation conflicts arise, a second parent adoption enables
the child to inherit from both parents through the law of intestate succes-
sion. An adopted child is entitled to inherit from and through the child's
adoptive parents, as though the child were the natural child of the par-
ents.' Although a non-legal parent can execute a will naming the child as a
beneficiary, the child does not have the right to inherit from members of the
non-legal parent's family. Furthermore, without the second parent adoption,
46. No. 87-24926 DA, slip. op. at 3-4, (Fla. Cir. Ct., Broward County, Mar. 31, 1989), re-
printed in part in 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1355 (May 30, 1989).
47. APRIL MARTIN, THE LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTING HANDBOOK: CREATING AND RAISING
OUR FAMILIES 251 (1993).
48. 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
49. Id. at 28. However, some states allow "psychological" or "de facto" parents to have
standing in court. See id. at 29-30 (citing OR. REV. STAT. §109.119[1] (1993)).
50. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1002 (Sur. 1992).
51. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.09(b) (West 1986).
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the child would not inherit from the non-legal parent if the will were mis-
placed or declared invalid.
A second parent adoption also provides the child with other financial
benefits. For example, the child will become eligible for coverage under
either parent's insurance policy. This allows the family to choose the better
of two policies and protects the child from complete loss of insurance if the
biological parent becomes unemployed or insurance is not available.52 Addi-
tionally, under the federal Social Security Act, a child can receive social
security benefits only through a deceased legal parent.' If the non-legal
parent is allowed to adopt, the child will have this entitlement through both
parents.
Finally, granting a second parent adoption ensures that doctors, hospi-
tals, schools, camps, consulates, and other institutions will permit both par-
ents to make decisions for the child. Questions concerning medical care for
the child can arise at any time or place. Without legal status, the non-legal
parent's authority to make medical decisions might be questioned and the
child's life endangered.
VI. CONCLUSION
Granting second parent adoptions is in children's and society's best
interests. As society changes,' courts and other institutions are recognizing
and protecting the rights of children reared by lesbian and gay parents.
Other courts must also recognize these rights. Each child deserves all the
love and care that two parents can provide. Each child is entitled to the
emotional security that flows from legal recognition of their familial relation-
ships. For the foregoing reasons, courts should grant second parent
adoptions when they are in a child's best interest.
52. See Chancellor v. Chancellor, 23 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Ct. App. 1929) (holding that the
term "child" in an insurance policy includes adopted children).
53. 42 U.S.C.A. § 402(d) (West Supp. 1994).
54. The number of children living with gay or lesbian parents is estimated to be 15.5
million. In re Alison D. and Virginia M. 572 N.E.2d 27, 30 (N.Y. 1991) (citing Katherine T.
Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives when the
Premise of the Nuclear Family has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 880-81 (1984); Nancy D. Polikoff,
This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-
Mother and other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 461 n.2 (1990)).

